Abstract
Introduction
Computer networks offer significant business opportunities but greatly increase the risk of exposing the system to security breaches that can make it unreliable and/or unusable and can make its services unavailable. In fact, in interconnected systems the information traverses continuously untrusted gateway and crosses potentially malicious intermediate systems. As a result, the request of network and system security has grown dramatically and research has put a great effort in developing security solutions that can guarantee the identity of the communicating parties, the integrity and the confidentiality of the information transferred across the network [1] .
Public key cryptography has demonstrated its effectiveness in achieving scalable confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation services, defying many of the threats posed by the deployment of open networks. However, the new possibilities stemming from public-key cryptography have reinforced the need for sophisticated systems to manage key lifecycle in complex organisations, from the initial secure distribution of keys to their successive update, suspension or revocation.
The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the emerging technology to enable the use of public key cryptography in large scale networks by providing automatic and scalable key/certificate management [2] . PKI services are the effective general-purpose tools for authentication, authorisation, encryption and digital signature in a variety of Internet/Intranet applications, including secure messaging and electronic commerce. The importance of PKIs in the support of commercial, educational and personal services is widely recognised and cannot be neglected. However, some significant issues in the development of large scale PKIs are still to be solved. One particularly debated aspect in PKI design is the mechanism for validating certificate status information. Several solution have been proposed, including the Certificate Revocation List scheme (CRLs), the On-line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) or the Certificate Revocation Trees (CRT) [3] , [4] , [5] and all of them presents advantages and disadvantages subject to discussion.
None of the mechanisms currently used for certificate status validation (CSV) can alone meet the timeliness and performance requirements of all applications and PKI environments. On the one hand, the requirements can greatly vary depending on the type of transaction the certificate is to be used for, on the amount of latency and computational load the involved parties are willing to tolerate. For example, high value financial transactions could require strict real-time support for certificate status validation, while low value commercial applications could tolerate higher latency [6] , [7] . On the other hand, an additional complexity in certificate status validation is solution heterogeneity. It is very unlikely that all PKI organizations employ the same validation mechanism, and it is realistic to assume that they deploy different methods to embody their management and security policies.
Only the integration and support of different CSV mechanisms seems a proper answer to different application requirements. Along this guideline, few solutions permit the inclusion and enabling of all major validation mechanisms into a unique custom tailored application [8] .
This paper does not present another method for CSV. Rather it proposes a framework to provide a flexible integration of solutions and a coherent management of CSV in wide application contexts and in heterogeneous PKI environments. Our design efforts emphasise the possibility to pursue a specific application tradeoff between timeliness and resource usage by permitting the dynamic selection of the most appropriate CSV method. In addition, the guidelines of the framework design are aimed at dynamic addition and integration of new mechanisms and at providing final users with automatic and transparent certificate status validation support by overcoming heterogeneity of PKI environments.
We claim that the development of the framework can greatly benefit from the exploitation of the Mobile Agent (MA) technology that can help in providing the required degree of flexibility, dynamicity and transparency because it possesses the same intrinsic properties [9] . In addition, MAs are designed to overcome the limits of the traditional client/server (C/S) model, thus permitting to improve the timeliness, efficiency and scalability of current C/S based certificate status validation mechanisms. The paper describes the implementation of a MA-based flexible prototype for certificate status validation, built on top of the MA system called SOMA (Secure and Open Mobile Agent) that permits an easy design of the framework services by providing appropriate levels of security and interoperability with existing PKI systems [10] .
Background
At the heart of public-key cryptography is the ability to verify the authenticity of public keys. This is usually achieved via public-key certificates that securely bind public keys to their owners. Certificates are data structures signed by a trusted PKI entity (the Certification Authority (CA)) that is responsible for vouching for authenticity of the public keys. The certificate validity is limited by an expiration date, but one certificate can also become invalid before expiration for various reason. For instance, the secret key may have been lost or compromised, or the owner electronic identity may have changed. In these cases the certificate must be revoked and all users notified of its invalidity: to this aim, several mechanisms have been proposed and deployed. This section gives a short overview of the most common CSV mechanisms, outlines their pros and cons (in terms for instance of timeliness, scalability, performance), and describes their different certificate status distribution model. All the available CSV mechanisms share the design goals of correctness, scalability, and availability [11] : all verifiers must be able to correctly determine the state of a certificate within well-known time bounds; the CSV costs should not exponentially grow with the increasing of the PKI user community size; replicated CSV servers should be provided to ensure service availability and responsiveness.
Among the solutions for CSV, Certificate Revocation List (CRL) [3] is the most widely diffused one. The CA signs and issues on a periodic basis a list, i.e. a CRL, identifying all the revoked certificates. The main advantage of the CRL scheme is simplicity, while problems stem from the fact that timeliness of information concerning revocation is not guaranteed (due to periodicity of issuance). In addition, CRLs do not scale well for large users community, because the size of CRLs increases with the number of certificates issued by the same CA. Thus, the retrieval and verification of CRLs can introduce significant bandwidth and latency costs in large scale PKIs. Several CRL based alternatives attempt to overcome the scalability problem: windowed CRL [11] , CRL distribution point (CRL DP) [12] , and delta CRLs [12] are the most known.
The other most widespread CSV mechanisms is the On-line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [4] . This protocol allows applications to determine the revocation status of a specified certificate by querying an online OCSP responder that provides fresh information about certificate status to clients. This mechanism can provide more timely revocation information than CRLs and seems also to scale well for large user communities. However, since each certificate status validation implies a specific client/server request to OCSP servers, the mechanism can overload the network and generate an intense traffic toward the OCSP responder. In addition, it requires client applications to generate and parse OCSP messages.
The Simple Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) [13] is an additional recent proposal that delegates to a trusted server the collection and verification, on behalf of the user, of CRLs or OCSP responses.
Another proposed mechanism for CSV is called short lifetime certificates that assumes that certificates have a lifetime so short that they cannot be revoked, and are certainly valid until they expire [14] . This solution avoids any burden of management of certificate status validation mechanisms, but significantly increases the number of issued certificates, and often requires an on-line CA that automatically issues short term certificates.
Further proposals for certificate status validation make use of Certificate Revocation Trees (CRT) and authenticated dictionaries that are a further extension of the CRT scheme [5] , [15] . Both approaches maintain, in a complex data structure, a set of assertions about the status of issued certificates, but differently from CRLs they are aimed at proving whether a certain certificate is revoked without sending the complete list to significantly reduce the network load. The drawback of these two schemes is that any changes in the set of revoked certificates, requires a re-computation (total or partial) of the revocation table.
Others exploit trusted directories [16] where a certificate is published only if it is valid, and it is removed from the directory as soon as it is revoked. The main difference of this solution with the others, is that it does not provide any form of non-repudiation: a user cannot prove to a third party that the certificate was effectively invalid at a certain time.
Another important aspect in describing and comparing the CSV mechanisms is the distribution of certificate status notices. Certificate status information can be acquired by certificate holders with either a pull or a push system, e.g. CRLs can be distributed by using both models. A pull approach requires that the certificate holders autonomously perform the action of checking a certificate before using it. For this goal the certificate holder should know which server to consult to verify the status of a certificate. The alternative push model can mitigate the costs of direct acquisition: each user passively waits for certificate status notices (generated by the certificate issuer) and consults only the cached information for certificate validation. The reduced user effort is achieved at the expense of reliability: denial of service attacks can easily prevent refresh of the local certificate status cache.
A Framework for Certificate Status Validation
The lack of a unique and comprehensive solution to handle CSV motivates the development of an infrastructure that can flexibly integrate all available mechanisms and can support the certificate validation in a dynamic and transparent way in all application scenarios and in heterogeneous PKI environments.
The basic design requirement is flexibility to help PKI administrators in the set-up and update of certificate status mechanisms and end-users in the certificate status validation. For this reason, it is important that the PKI infrastructure can easily exploit all available CSV mechanisms by following both pull and push distribution models, and that can permit the selection of alternative validation strategies, depending on the different application.
Another primary requirement is dynamicity. Because the availability of the certificate status validation service is a necessary and central condition for PKI liability, all management solutions have to maintain the service while incorporating new versions and variations. For instance, while a PKI administrator is adding a new protocol that handles certificate status validation, not only the validation service should go on, but also the PKI users should dynamically benefit from the new protocol without requiring heavy clientside reconfiguration.
A final but fundamental consideration for the implementation of the framework for certificate status validation is to meet an adequate level of transparency. Transparency is an essential property for a PKI to be effective. Final users should ignore the underlying mechanisms available for validating a certificate status and should be relieved of the effort of dealing with heterogeneity of solutions. Especially unskilled PKI users should be granted an automatic and transparent service for certificate status validation. This section provides a high level view of the framework that we propose for certificate status validation before detailing example implementation and usage in the next sections. As shown in Figure 1 , the infrastructure is composed of several coordinated distributed services to achieve the design goals. A configuration service should be provided within any PKI environment to support PKI administrators in setting up, update and integrating different certificate status validation mechanisms. The configuration service can coordinate with the repository service that is in charge of maintaining consistent information on the certificate status validation mechanisms currently available in the PKI domain, such as for instance the type and key features of the each solution. Currently, PKIs provide a configuration service with the Certification Practice Statements that, between other information, provides a description and a reference to the CSV mechanisms used within the PKI [3] . The discovery service could perform the retrieval of the information from the repository service. A discovery service coordinates with the repository service to obtain information on the behalf of the PKI end-users about the mechanisms for CSV in large scale and heterogeneous PKI environments. Once the discovery phase is completed, the validation service is in charge of supporting end users in the checking phase with either a pull or a push distribution model according to user requirements.
In addition, the framework supports a preference service in charge of helping PKI end-users in the specification/enforcement of their preferences and their dynamic maintenance. Preferences can include requirements for specific CSV tailored to user application context, or to the maximum latency or to the processing power of the current terminal of a user (laptop, personal data assistant, PC or workstation). Moreover, preferences can specify actions to perform in case of an invalid certificate, from the issuing of a user warning to the logging of the event for future reference. 
Mobile Agents for Managing CSV
The framework for certificate status validation can be implemented by using different distributed programming technologies. The client/server model could be adopted while a less traditional choice could lead to explore the use of programming model based on some forms of mobility, such as the Code on Demand, remote Evaluation, and Mobile Agent cases [9] . In our opinion, the realisation of the framework can significantly benefit from the adoption of the Mobile Agent (MA) technology to achieve the needed degree of transparency, dynamicity and flexibility because the paradigm itself is designed according to the same properties [17] . MAs can be effectively exploited to optimise certificate status validation, to support flexible and dynamic integration between different validation mechanisms and to deal with PKI heterogeneity on the behalf of their responsible users.
Mobile agents are software entities that are designed to autonomously roam networks by transferring themselves (code and state together) to find and to locally process the information they have to operate upon, thus reducing network traffic and latency [17] . In addition, mobile entities can dynamically change their execution environments and distribute themselves among the hosts in the network to achieve performance optimisation or load balancing.
A primary advantage of adopting MAs is the possibility to address the flexibility requirement expressed by both PKI administrators and end-users. The exploitation of MAs permits PKI administrators to provide validity status responses for any X.509 certificate, using many current validation mechanisms, and exploiting both pull and push distribution models. For instance MAs can provide not only efficient solutions for supporting pull models, but can also facilitate the development of push models because they are themselves designed according to the socalled Internet push model. In addition, the MA paradigm allows end-users to specify flexible CSV strategies, being MAs easily personalised to encapsulate end-user preferences.
The other important property that allows MAs to be dynamically extended with new functionalities permits to answer the dynamicity requirement of the framework for CSV. In PKI environments administrators can exploit this MA feature to dynamically update the CSV protocols without service suspension to cope with evolving management requirements. Additionally, end-users could benefit from MA dynamicity: they can specify in their preferences a push delivery service to save the cost of certificate status acquisition and later can change the certificate acquisition mechanism by simply modifying the requirements embedded in their agents.
Moreover, the autonomy property of mobile agents permits to achieve the transparency requirement of the framework. The introduction of MAs autonomously acting on behalf of PKI end-users could reduce the effort required to complete a CSV by transparently retrieving all the necessary information. PKI users could even disconnect from the network while their agents complete their task of validating a certificate. The use of MAs can also permit to deal with heterogeneity of the CSV mechanisms. On the one hand, MAs provide optimal conditions for seamless system integration because they are generally computer and transport-layer independent. On the other hand, MAs can move to target PKIs and there establish "channels" based on proprietary CSV protocols without requiring any ad-hoc configuration of user application.
One MA-based Prototype for CSV
The proposed infrastructure for CSV has been realised by exploiting the underlying facilities of the MA system called SOMA [10] . SOMA is a platform for the design, implementation and deployment of distributed applications in several application scenarios in open, global, and untrusted environments, such as the Internet. In particular, SOMA addresses the interoperability requirement for open system by exploiting the CORBA technology [18] and is suitable for untrusted environment because of its security model that aims to protect both agents and sites of execution against reciprocal potentially malicious behaviour.
The SOMA environment
SOMA provides a hierarchy of locality abstractions that helps in modelling different schemes of interconnected networks, ranging from simple LANs to architectures composed of several LANs variously interconnected by bridges, routers, gateways, and firewalls. Any node owns at least one place that constitutes the agent execution environment. Several places can be grouped into a domain abstraction that corresponds to a network locality. In each domain, a default place hosts a gateway to perform inter-domain functionality and to maintain domain-specific runtime information.
SOMA is implemented in Java to exploit its easy integrability with the Web scenario and its intrinsic portability in heterogeneous environments. SOMA has been designed according to a layered architecture with several modules in each layer, built on top of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), as depicted in Figure 2 . The basic layer provides a rich set of facilities to simplify the deployment of MA-based services. On top of the basic layer, the security module makes available a large range of security mechanisms and tools, to permit different trade-offs between performances and security levels, while the interoperability module exploits the CORBA technology [18] to achieve the full integration with other CORBA-compliant environments. The SOMA basic facilities include:
• the naming facility to associate entities with globally unique identifiers (GUID) and to organise these identifiers in name systems to make possible the tracing of entities even if they move. This facility allows to put together a set of different naming systems (DNS-, CORBA-, and LDAP-compliant), possibly characterised by different resolution policies, and is currently implemented by a coordinated set of dedicated agents; • the migration facility to permit the migration of one entity that should change its allocation. The reallocated entity should be traced also in the new location by any entity in need of its services, and, if it is active, should transparently restart its execution at the new location; • the communication facility to provide tools for coordination and communication between possibly mobile entities. Within the same place, agents interact by means of shared objects, such as blackboards and tuple spaces for tight cooperation. Outside the scope of the place, agents can perform coordinated tasks by exchanging asynchronous messages that are delivered to agents also in case of migration; • the monitoring facility to observe the state of local resources and services and to provide this information to the application level for permitting dynamic adaptive reactions. SOMA can monitor both system indicators (e.g. CPU load, file system occupation, printer status, available network bandwidth and collision rate) and application indicators (e.g. available services, program versioning, local agent states); • the persistency facility to give the possibility to suspend temporarily executing agents and to store them on a persistent medium. The facility allows agents not to waste system resources while they are waiting for external events such as the reconnection of one user or terminal to yield back the results of autonomously performed operations. In addition, it can be also exploited in providing fault-tolerant solutions by organising and disseminating stored copies of agents. As shown in Figure 2 , on top of the basic facilities we have realised advanced SOMA facilities to provide a rich set of mechanisms for interoperability and security. The interoperability facility allows SOMA agents to interwork with existing software and hardware components via compliance with CORBA IIOP specification [18] . SOMA agents can play the role of CORBA clients and can register themselves as CORBA servers to offer access points to an application outside the SOMA system. In addition, SOMA is compliant with the OMG work on MASIF [19] that standardises the basic functions an MA framework should offer for agent management and transfer to external systems, whether MA-based or not.
The security facility provides tools for protecting both places and mobile agents. Authentication of incoming mobile agents is based on standard certificates and on a public key infrastructure; authorisation extends the Java standard mechanisms for access control. Secrecy and integrity for agent/message transfer in SOMA exploits standard solutions for securing the communication layer. In particular, SOMA employs Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [20] that can support a set of different cryptographic algorithms to provide channel integrity, authentication, and secrecy. The protection of mobile agents from the execution environment has required the development of specific protocols that can suit different application scenarios. The goal of the protocols is to detect any possible modification of the data collected by agents executing in an untrusted domain [21] . Note that the wide variety of security Further details about the SOMA programming framework and its implementation are presented elsewhere [10] and are out of the scope of this paper, where we specifically focus on the SOMA based infrastructure for CSV.
The SOMA based CSV Prototype
The locality abstractions of the SOMA system can easily model complex PKI infrastructures that can describe very different organisations, from strictly hierarchical to fully distributed [22] . Any PKI environment is represented by a different SOMA domain and each PKI component (Certification Authority, certificate server, end-user) can be associated with one SOMA place. SOMA domains can be organised into hierarchical or distributed architectures depending on organisation PKI requirements and security policies.
Within each SOMA domain the management infrastructure for CSV is implemented by several coordinated agents, anyone is in charge of specific management tasks. We distinguish between stationary and mobile agents: a stationary agent does not change its allocation, while a mobile agent is not bound to the system where has started execution and can be exploited for information retrieval and updating. Figure 3 shows the configuration service of the framework that exploits mobile Configuration Agents (CoA) for the dynamic installation/upgrade of CSV protocols in the available servers provided by the PKI environment. The use of MAs permits sophisticated automation for installation/upgrade: because these actions can naturally be automated, they are transported by CoAs that are in charge of roaming the set of CSV servers. CoAs could locally analyse the features of the servers and perform appropriate configuration steps.
Any SOMA domain hosts at least one stationary Repository Agent (RA), that offers and maintain the repository service. The RA is responsible for maintaining consistent information on the provided CSV methods and on the names of CSV servers associated with their current physical location. The RA may be designed according to the master/slave model to improve the effectiveness of information maintenance: slave mobile RAs can be sent to CSV servers to monitor for changes in their configurations; at any configuration modifications (introduction of new CSV protocols or protocol versioning update), the slave RAs are in charge of communicating them to the master RA that updates accordingly its information database.
The repository agent provides its information mainly to MAs that implement the discovery service. They are called Discovery Agents (DA) and migrate to the place hosting the RA execution to process locally the information to reduce network utilisation.
At any SOMA domain there is at least one server for distributing certificate status information to PKI end-users that can benefit from the exploitation of mobile agents. MAs can be used to locally collect CRLs or OCSP responses and to yield back the information to their responsible by allowing network disconnection of end-users during information retrieval. In addition, MAs can be exploited to monitor for certificate status information update and, once any change is identified, they can immediately notify interested users. Flexible push delivery schemes can be developed on a per user basis: a user could require to be immediately notified about a certificate status change, while others could be interested in certificate status information only at predefined time intervals.
Finally, end-user places of SOMA domains provide stationary Preference Agents (PA) in charge of embedding user preferences and performing their enforcement. The enforcement process includes the discovery of the CSV methods available in the PKI environments involved in CSV process, the selection of the mechanism satisfying the user constraints and the certificate status checking. PAs can make use of several slave mobile agents to complete their tasks: they can create DAs and delegate them for spawning other agents in charge of performing the certificate status checking. In addition, PAs can dynamically propagate to slave agents preference updates to accommodate user evolving requirements. In fact, the dynamicity of the MA paradigm permits to slave MAs to adapt behaviour to environment changes, without restarting their execution.
It is worth noticing that both stationary and mobile agents demand for adequate level of security. Agents encapsulate critical management functions and intrinsically require strong protection both while migrating and executing in hosting nodes. In particular, the user preferences embedded within PA states could require secrecy and integrity: this information should be modified and eventually accessed by only its responsible users, while the preferences passed by PAs to DAs for CSV mechanism discovery and selection should be unforgeable. If any tampering occurs, DA behaviour could be irremediably modified and PKI end-users damaged. We claim that the SOMA security facility described in section 5.1 can provide the required secrecy and integrity mechanisms to build a secure infrastructure for CSV. In addition, fault tolerance techniques [23] can be exploited to guarantee agent availability in case of communication failures or attacks that may deny agents from roaming.
A Case Study
This section provides a sample implementation of the MA-based prototype for certificate status validation within the EuroPKI project [24] . The EuroPKI is an European wide PKI that has been set up within the ICE-TEL and ICE-CAR projects with the goal of providing the necessary support for the deployment of secure applications for Commerce, Public Administrations and Research Institutions.
One of the results widely accepted in the management of the EuroPKI is that a PKI should offer its own CSV services with openness and flexibility that doesn't bind the PKI users to a specific validation mechanism. In addition, the application requirements should drive the selection of the mechanisms: in some scenarios the promptness in providing certificate status information is the most important attribute, while in others is the liability associated with the provider of the status information, or the possibility to access status information on-line.
We used the EuroPKI to offer testbed for the SOMA framework: Figure 4 shows different PKI user communities mapped over SOMA domains. In particular, the Politecnico di Torino CA (POLITO) provides its users with two CSV mechanisms: monthly issued CRLs (distributed via HTTP), and one OCSP responder. The other PKIs only provide CRLs generally issued once per month, or once a half year for the ROOT CA (that issues certificates for subordinated CAs and not for end users).
Let us assume that users within the University of Bologna (UNIBO) domain need to check certificates issued by the POLITO domain. The SOMA framework provides the necessary support to overcome the heterogeneity of validation mechanisms by using:
• stationary repository agents that can contain the information for the different CSV mechanisms provided within each community; • mobile discovery agents that are in charge of finding out which mechanisms are available in each domain; • validation agents that are responsible for checking the status of a certificate according to the preferences included in the user profile agent.
At system logon our implementation assigns any PKI user with a single PA to assist her in certificate validation within any applications. The user, by employing the simple interface shown in Figure 5 , can inform her own local profile agent about the timeliness to be respected for any specific application, the computational overload tolerated, the required degree of non repudiability and the priorities to give to the requirements. If the user does not specify any constraints, the PA is launched with a default configuration that reflects the policy statements of the current PKI. Otherwise, the user specifies her constraints. For instance, let us consider the case of a user that should take an important decision based on the content of a just received signed message, and has to prove a posteriori to her boss that she carefully checked the integrity of the message by validating the signer certificate. In this case, the PA should be configured with the highest priority assigned to non-repudiation, without any constraint on timeliness and computation overload. Note that the interface of the PA can be at any time modified, providing the user with the dynamic possibility to change her own validation preferences. As a final consideration, PAs can be easily plugged into all common applications by permitting transparent, efficient and interoperable CSV: when an application requires a certificate check, PAs are automatically invoked and the specific application requirements are retrieved to drive the validation process.
Conclusions
The paper presents an MA framework for certificate status validation that provides a flexible, dynamic, transparent, and interoperable environment to PKIs in need of offering services for large and heterogeneous user communities. The framework benefits from the intrinsic characteristics of MAs and from the specific facilities of the SOMA system. SOMA provides the locality abstractions required to model complex PKIs and their interconnections, and robust security mechanisms that allow to delegate the certificate status validation process to mobile agents.
We have implemented and tested a prototype of the described framework within the EuroPKI certification infrastructure by integrating different CSV mechanisms and by providing users with a flexible common interface that allows to specify and choose validation preferences in terms of timeliness, local computational overload, and non-repudiation.
We are currently integrating common user applications (e-mail and web client) with the CSV framework by implementing plug-ins that permits applications to interact with the MA-based CSV system.
